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The Neal Report and the Crisis in Antitrust 
Herbert Hovenkamp*
 The Neal Report
 
1 was secretly commissioned by President Lyndon Johnson in 
late 1967.  The President asked Phil C. Neal, Dean of the University of Chicago Law 
School, to lead a group of distinguished lawyers and economists in reporting on the 
state of competition in American industry and recommend reforms of the antitrust laws.  
President Johnson requested the Report by June 30, 1968, about four months prior to 
the election, and its release was intended to be part of the LBJ re-election strategy.  
However, Johnson’s political standing was severely damaged by the unpopular war in 
Vietnam, and in March, 1968, he announced that he would not run for reelection.  The 
authors finished the Report nevertheless, and it was submitted to President Johnson in 
July, 1968, and released to the public early in 1969.2
 The authors of the Report included six law professors who were teachers and 
scholars of antitrust,
 
3 three economists,4 and three practicing antitrust attorneys.5  The 
entire project took only seven months to complete, involved no new research, and 
contains virtually no citation.  Yet it proposed expansive antitrust reforms, including 
most centrally a “Concentrated Industries Act” which gave the Attorney General a 
mandate to “search out” oligopolies6
                                                          
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
1 Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy (May 27, 1969), originally published 
at 115 Cong. Rec. 11, 13890. 
2 See Stephen Calkins, Antitrust Modernization: Looking Backwards, Symposium, The Antitrust 
Enterprise: Principle and Execution, 31 J.Corp.L. 421 (2006). 
3 Phil C. Neal (chair, and Dean of the Univ. of Chicago Law School); Willam F. Baxter (Stanford 
Law School); Robert H. Bork (Yale Law); Carl H. Fulda (University of Texas Law School); 
William K. Jones (Columbia University Law School); James A. Rahl (Northwestern University 
Law School). 
4 Paul W. MacAvoy (MIT) James W. McKie (Vanderbilt), and Lee E. Preston (Univ. of California, 
Berkeley). 
5 Dennis G. Lyons (Arnold & Porter), George D. Reycraft (Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft); 
Richard E. Sherwood (O'Melveny and Myers). 
6 Defined as CR4>70 – that is, using the four firm concentration ratio, the sums of the market 
shares of the four largest firms in the industry exceeded 70%. 
 and order divestitures to the point that no firm 
would end up with a market share exceeding 12%.  In addition the Report 
recommended a much more aggressive merger provision that essentially would have 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1348707
condemned mergers in any large industry where the four firm concentration ratio (CR4) 
exceeded 50% and one of the firms involved in the merger exceeded a market share of 
10%.  It is worth noting that such a market could have an HHI as low as 650 or so, well 
under the 1000 HHI that the government’s Merger Guidelines currently in force regard 
as “unconcentrated,” and in which mergers have a virtual safe harbor.  In addition, the 
Report recommended several amendments to the Robinson-Patman price 
discrimination statute, many of which were designed to weaken it.  Finally, the Report 
recommended patent reform that went not to the quality and quantity of issued patents 
but rather to licensing and use.  The principal recommendations were a requirement 
that all patent licenses be registered, and that if a patent is licensed to one licensee it 
must be licensed to all other prospective licensees on nondiscriminatory terms.  Finally, 
the Report recommended that a repository of economic data concerned mainly with 
industry structure and profits be collected and disseminated. 
 A couple of historical footnotes: first, Robert H. Bork wrote a stinging dissent from 
the Report’s recommendations and firmly aligned himself with the Chicago School 
critique.7  William F. Baxter kept silent but would very largely repudiate the report later 
as he learned more about economics.8  Second, all of the recommendations in the Neal 
Report were ignored, in part because the change in Administration from Johnson to 
Nixon killed any political momentum for massive antitrust reform.  Indeed, very early in 
his Presidency Nixon appointed a second, competing Commission, this one chaired by 
George J. Stigler, another prominent member of the University of Chicago faculty 
except in the economics department, as well as several of his colleagues.9  The Stigler 
Report was never officially released,10 but it leaked out in May, 1969.11
                                                          
7 Separate Statement of Robert H. Bork 2 Antitrust L. & Econ. 53 (Winter 1968).  
   The Stigler 
8See Richard Schmalensee, Bill Baxter in the Antitrust Arena: an Economist’s Appreciation, 51 
Stan.L.Rev. 1317, 1319 (1999). 
 
9The members were George J. Stigler (University of Chicago, chair),  Ward S. Bowman, Jr. 
(Yale, law and economics), Ronald H. Coase (Univ. of Chicago, economics), Roger S. Cramton 
(University of Michigan Law School), Kenneth W. Dam (University of Chicago Law School), 
Raymond H. Mulford (President, Owens-Illinois, Inc.), Richard A. Posner (Univ. of Chicago Law 
School) , Peter O. Steiner (Univ. of Michigan law and economics), and Alexander L. Stott (vice 
president , AT&T). 
10 It was subsequently published, however, at 115 Cong. Rec. 12, 15933-15942 (June 16, 
1969); and reprinted in 2 Antitrust Law and Economics Review 13 (No. 3, Spring, 1969).  The 
editors of that journal did not disguise the fact that they sided with the Neal Report and largely 
rejected the recommendations of the Stigler Report. 
Report disagreed with the industrial concentration warnings in the Neal Report, largely 
rejected the correlation between market concentration, profits, and anticompetitive 
results that the Neal Report purported to find, and made several technical 
recommendations for revision of the antitrust laws.  At least in the short term, its 
recommendations faired no better than those contained in the Neal Report. 
 Reading the Neal Report today is a trip to another world.  But in fact it 
represented the received orthodoxy of its day.  The tragedy of the Neal Report is that 
the model it represented was just on the verge of complete, catastrophic replacement.  
The views expressed there reflected the culmination of thirty years of industrial 
organization thinking that we today identify as the “structure-conduct-performance” (S-
C-P) paradigm.12
 The S-C-P paradigm was one of the most elegant and certainly the most tested 
model of industrial economics up to its time.  Indeed, its greatest perceived virtues were 
its simplicity and its robustness.  The theory represented the high point of structuralism 
in industrial organization economics, resting on the proposition that certain market 
structures were highly concentrated and experienced high barriers to entry, making 
certain types of conduct inevitable.  Under the very strong Cournot assumptions of the 
day oligopolists simply could not avoid setting prices above costs and continuously and 
excessively differentiating the products. The result was high short-run profits, excessive 
investment in product differentiation and advertising, reluctance to cut price in order to 
grow market share, and general stagnation.  The theory appeared to be verified by 
numerous studies showing positive correlations between industrial concentration and 
profits – the more concentrated the industry the higher its price-cost margins.
  Indeed, the publication of the Neal Report played no small part in 
instigating a massive reaction among younger academics that eventually cast the S-C-P 
paradigm onto the dung heap of defunct economic doctrines. 
13
                                                                                                                                                                                           
11 See Louis M. Kohlmeier, Study of Conglomerates for Nixon Urges No Antitrust Suits to Block 
Their Mergers, Wall St. J., May 23, 1969.  This article was published two days after the Neal 
Report was released.  See Calkins, note __ at 433. 
12 See E. S. Mason, Economic Concentration and the Monopoly Problem (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1964). 
13 See Leonard Weiss, "The Concentration-Profit Relationship and Antitrust," Industrial 
Concentration: The New Learning, Harvey J. Goldschmid, H. Michael Mann, and J. Fred 
Weston, eds., Little Brown & Co. (1974) (summarizing numerous pre-1970s studies).  See also 
Joe S. Bain, Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration: American Manufacturing, 
1936B1940, 65 Q.J.Econ. 293 (1951). Other important work includes H. M. Mann, Seller 
Concentration, Barriers to Entry, and Rates of Return in Thirty Industries, 1950B1960, 48 Rev. 
Econ. & Stat. 296 (1966). 
  By 
contrast, the relationship between conduct and poor performance was thought to be 
virtually impossible to quantify. 
Under the principle of excluded middle, if the structure dictated the conduct and 
the conduct dictated the performance, then conduct dropped out as an interesting 
subject of study.  Thus the S-C-P paradigm led directly to the conclusion that structure 
and not conduct is what antitrust policy should be about.  Thus the Neal Report could 
state that: 
Effective antitrust laws must bring about both competitive behavior and 
competitive industry structure.  In the long run, competitive structure is the 
more important since it creates conditions conducive to competitive 
behavior.14
This emphasis on structure and de-emphasis of conduct also motivated Donald 
F. Turner’s proposal in the early 1960s that firms in oligopolistic industries should be 
broken up because price competition in such markets could not be expected to 
emerge.
 
15  The editors of the Antitrust Law and Economics Review, who were deeply 
sympathetic to the Neal Report and hostile toward the Stigler Report, introduced their 
publication of the latter with a proposed set of “Guidelines” for the antitrust enforcement 
agencies. The Guidelines were entitled “A Structure-Conduct-Performance 
Questionnaire,” and consisted of queries about the size of markets, the level of 
concentration, the amount of product differentiation, and the height of entry barriers.  A 
few conduct questions were tacked on to the end.16
                                                          
14 Neal Report, note __ at ____. 
15 Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism 
and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV.L.REV. 655 (1962).   These recommendations appeared earlier in 
more truncated form in C. Kaysen & D. Turner, Antitrust Policy 110-119, 266-272 (1959). Turner 
went on to be head of the Antitrust Division from 1965-1968, in the years leading up to the Neal 
Report. 
16 See “Appendix: A Structure-Conduct-Performance Questionnaire,” 2 Antitrust Law and 
Economics Review 8 (#2, Spring, 1969). 
 
 Today we can find much to criticize and even mock in the Neal Report.  But it 
was largely faithful to the dominant industrial economics and law of its day. Its 
recommendations were built on some of the best theory coming out of an economic 
model that was just in the process of ending its period of domination.  The tragedy of 
the Neal Report is that, while it was highly sensitive to where the intellectual winds were 
blowing from, it paid too little attention to where they were going. 
 Initially the S-C-P paradigm had offered a robust solution to problems that had 
festered within competition theory ever since the rise of marginalist economics in the 
late nineteenth century. 17   Prior to the Great Depression industrial economists had 
been unable to solve a problem that Alfred Marshall had observed already in his 
Principles of Economics in 1890: in the presence of fixed costs competition tends to 
drive prices down to marginal cost without enough left over to cover fixed costs, leading 
to “ruinous” competition.18  During an era when technological progress was greatly 
increasing the proportion of fixed costs in production, this theory seemed to explain why 
so many economists opposed the antitrust laws and tended to favor collusion facilitating 
cooperative ventures such as trade associations.19
 Edward Chamberlin’s Theory of Monopolistic Competition largely solved the 
equilibrium problem in 1933,
 The prevailing models assumed 
fungible products and “representative” firms – i.e., firms that were all more-or-less the 
same in significant characteristics. 
20
 But that left open the question how the antitrust laws should be applied.  While 
Marshall tended to see firms as similar, the Chamberlin story was one of extreme 
diversity in both strategy and behavior.  The one unifying element was structure, a result 
 but did so by abandoning the Marshallian notion that 
firms in multifirm markets pursued relentless price competition.  Instead, they competed 
by differentiating their products.  Further, this differentiation was “excessive,” in the 
sense that it was driven by pursuit of mini-monopolies rather than by consumer interest 
in an optimal variety of products at competitive prices.  While the Marshallian story 
denigrated antitrust, Chamberlin’s theory seemed to call for a great deal of it.  Indeed, 
this change in dominant models explains why the Roosevelt Administration so abruptly 
shifted  its policy from virtual abandonment of antitrust and encouragement of collusion 
to one of aggressively enforcing the antitrust laws. 
                                                          
17 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Neoclassical Crisis in U.S. Competition Policy, 1890-1955 
(Iowa Legal Studies research paper, July, 2008, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1156927). 
18 Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (1890).  See D.H. Robertson, Piero Sraffa and 
G.F.S. Shove, Increasing Returns and the Representative Firm 50, reprinted in John 
Cunningham Wood, Alfred Marshall: Critical Assessments (London: Taylor and Francis, 1993). 
19 On the impact of the fixed cost controvery in antitrust policy prior to the 1930s, see Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937 at 308-322 (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard 
Univ. Press, 2001). 
20 Edward Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard Univ. 
Press, 1933).  On the theory’s profound impact on Marshallian equilibrium theory, see Mark 
Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect 375 (5th ed. 1996). 
of the fact that Chamberlin’s theory also imported Cournot-style structural analysis into 
formal industrial organization analysis to a much greater extent than before.  The 
defining characteristic of Cournot models at this time was formulas that related the 
markup of price over cost to two principal variables: the number of firms in the market 
and their size disparities. 
 Monopolistic competition largely solved the fixed cost problem and made 
equilibrium possible.  Chamberlin’s equilibrium would always be suboptimal, however, 
with prices above marginal cost, continuous excess capacity, and excessive investment 
in product differentiation.  In 1940 John Maurice Clark published his pathbreaking essay 
on “Workable Competition,” which argued that antitrust policy should not trouble itself 
with the pursuit of perfect competition.21
 A few years later Joe Bain, the most prominent industrial organization economist 
prior to the rise of the Chicago School, exalted the strong link between market structure 
and the workability of competition.  In the process Bain laid the foundation for an 
antitrust policy whose principal goal was to ensure that industry did not become 
excessively concentrated, but would maintain just enough firms to ensure that price 
competition remained a part of business strategy and that product differentiation did not 
become excessive.
  Rather, it should be satisfied with a set of 
compromises.  Clark’s genius lay in his observations that market imperfections have a 
way of cancelling each other out – for example, product differentiation made perfectly 
competitive equilibria impossible, but it also made collusion much more difficult to 
maintain.  The interesting cases for Clark were the middles ones that fell between the 
monopolistic and the highly competitive, where policy making could have its most 
important role. 
22
                                                          
21 John Maurice Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 Am. Econ. Rev. 243 
(1940). 
22 Joe S. Bain, Workable Competition in Oligopoly: Theoretical Considerations and Some Empirical 
Evidence, 40 AM.ECON.REV. 35 (papers and proceeding) (1950).  Id. at 38-39): 
Whatever the degree of association within oligopolies between competitive behavior 
and results, it seems quite likely that such behavior may be in turn either influenced 
or determined by certain characteristics of the underlying market structure.  If so, a 
demonstrated association between market structure and results would establish the 
more fundamental determinants of workability of competition (and, also, 
determinants more easily influenced by conventional public policy measures). 
  For Bain, one of the most important problems was high 
concentration accompanied by high barriers to entry.  Chamberlin’s basic model of 
monopolistic competition and product differentiation had assumed that entry was easy.  
Competition seemed to be more workable, with prices driven to total costs, when entry 
was easy.  But high concentration accompanied by high entry barriers led to the worst 
of both worlds – namely, excessive product differentiation and excessive profits. 23  To 
the extent the theory offered a set of ideas that were useful for policy purposes, they 
were ideas about structure.  In his market dominating book on Industrial Organization, 
which was published in 1959, Bain concluded that conduct was too heterogenous and 
too difficult to evaluate.  The verifiable conditions for workable competition could be 
stated only by reference to industry structure. “We eschew,” he wrote, “any general 
attempt to state an operational criterion of the conduct conditions of workable competition, 
and adhere in the main to a suggestion only of structural conditions.” 24
 Bain’s work and that of his Harvard teacher Edward S. Mason have come to be 
identified with the “Harvard School” of industrial organization and the S-C-P Paradigm.
 
25  
The theory was unquestionably dominant among the industrial economist and policy 
making gentry in the 1960s, including most of those in Neal’s group.  But when Neal 
and his colleagues began penning their Report  it was already well on its way to 
crumbling.  Chicago School writers had already exploded the leverage theory of tying26 
and provided competitively benign explanations for resale price maintenance.27  Stigler 
had written a formative article arguing that the strict Cournot assumptions about 
oligopoly should be relaxed, that the number of firms was only one of many factors that 
indicated whether a market was prone to noncompetitive pricing, and that there was 
much more room for competition in highly concentrated markets than previously 
thought.28  The Bainian definition of entry barriers was in dispute.29
                                                          
23 Joe S. Bain, Barriers to New Competition: their Character and Consequences in 
Manufacturing Industries (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1956). 
24 Joe S. Bain, Industrial Organization 427 (New York: Wiley, 1959). 
25 Although Bain was educated at Harvard he spent nearly his entire academic career (1939-
1975) at the University of California, Berkeley economics department. 
26 Ward Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 Yale L.J. 19 (1957). 
27 Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & Econ. 86 (1960). 
28 George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J.Pol.Econ. 45 (1964). 
29 George J. Stigler, The Organization of Industry 67 (1968). 
  Richard Posner, a 
member of the competing Stigler task force, had written an answer to Turner’s argument 
for structural solutions to the oligopoly problem, relying heavily on Stigler’s competing 
theory of oligopoly.30  A broad based attack was being launched against the proposition 
that one could infer monopoly power from high accounting profits.31  Finally, Robert H. 
Bork, a dissenting member of the Neal Commission, and Ward Bowman, who was on 
the Stigler Commission, had already published their influential “The Crisis in Antitrust.”32
One could continue with this list,
 
33 which makes it easy to criticize the S-C-P 
paradigm as structuralism run amok, to see it as preoccupied with making firms smaller 
and as completely insensitive economies of scale or scope.  There is even a tendency 
to see it as anti-consumer, aided in no small part by some of the characterizations in 
Bork’s and Bowman’s famous Crisis essay.34
But the Neal Report was clearly not anti-consumer on its own terms.  In fact, it 
concluded that “consumer welfare is … in the forefront of antitrust policy.”
 
35
                                                          
30Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 Stan.L.Rev. 
1562 (1969).  See also R. Posner, Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and Economic 
Welfare, 28 Stan.L.Rev. 903 (1976) (recapping the debate). 
31 The literature is summarized in Franklin M. Fisher and John J. McGowan, On the Misuse of 
Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits, 73 Am.Econ. Rev. 82 (Mar. 1983).  See 
also Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J.L. & Econ. 351 
(1971); and Harold Demsetz, “Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly” 164 In Harvey J. 
Goldschmid, H. Michael Mann, and J. Fred Weston, eds., Industrial Concentration: The New 
Learning (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974). 
 
32 Bork and Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, Fortune Dec. 1963; and 65 Col.L.Rev. 363 (1965). 
33 For differing perspectives, see Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 
127 Univ. of Pennsylvania L. Rev. 925 (1979); Leonard W. Weiss, The Structure-Conduct-
Performance Paradigm and Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1104, 1105 (1979). 
34 Bork and Bowman, Crisis in Antitrust, 65 Col.L.Rev. at 364 (1965): 
  The 
Long-standing contradictions at the root of antitrust doctrine have today brought it 
to a crisis of policy. From its inception with the passage of the Sherman Act in 
1890, antitrust has vacillated between the policy of preserving competition and 
the policy of preserving competitors from their more energetic and efficient rivals. 
It is the rapid acceleration of the latter "protectionist" trends in antitrust that has 
brought on the present crisis. Anti-free-market forces now have the upper hand 
and are steadily broadening and consolidating their victory. The continued 
acceptance and expansion of their doctrine, which today constitutes antitrust's 
growing edge, threaten within the foreseeable future to destroy the antitrust laws 
as guarantors of a competitive economy 
35Neal Report, note __ at ___. 
difference between the milieu that came to an end just about the time the Neal Report 
was published – indeed, in part because of it – was not that the older regime was 
unconcerned about consumer welfare while the successor regime was.  Rather, it lay in 
the set of economic premises upon which the theories were built.  Nothing in the Neal 
Report favored the protection of small business for its own sake at the expense of 
consumers, and the authors specifically mentioned high prices as one of the evils 
produced by high concentration.36
                                                          
36 Id. at ____ 
   The whole premise of the Bainian analysis of entry 
barriers as factors that deter entry even while profits are high, or the use of accounting 
data to infer a relationship between concentration and high profits, was that high prices 
were in fact the evil to be addressed.  The questions pertained to the set of economic 
assumption that would get the job done. To that end, the turning point marked by the 
Neal Report and the reaction to it was at least as much a change in prevailing economic 
theory as in antitrust policy. 
